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xzheng@ncsu.edu.I. Introduction
The role of limit orders in the process of price discovery in ﬁnancial markets has been
extensively studied. Limit orders, deﬁned as price-contingent instructions to buy or sell
a ﬁnancial security at the speciﬁed (limit) price, represent the major part of liquidity on
organized exchanges. Most electronic equity markets around the globe are organized as pure
limit order books; even on hybrid markets such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
limit orders account for more than half of all trading activities.
Much of the related literature discusses the following aspects of limit order markets: (1)
transaction costs, (2) spread decomposition, (3) order submission strategies, and (4) price
formation.1 Parlour (1998) presents a model of limit order book using a stochastic dynamic
game and characterizes the optimal order choice between submitting a limit order and a
market order. However, in her model limit order cancellations are not allowed. Holliﬁeld
et al. (2004) build a structural model of a pure limit order market which captures the
trade-oﬀ among the order price, the order execution probability, and the winner’s curse
risk associated with diﬀerent feasible order choices. Battalio et al. (2002) gauge execution
quality across markets by comparing the limit order ﬁll rates and times to execution on
primary and regional exchanges. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) examine whether the
limit order book has a signaling eﬀect on the future price change and whether the NYSE
specialists take advantage of this information. Overall, the focus has been on limit order
executions. Little attention has been paid to limit order cancellations.2 In this paper we
explicitly model cancellation of limit orders (jointly with execution) and show that limit order
cancellations contain information that should also be incorporated into decisions regarding
order submission strategies.
Limit order traders face two types of risk: (i) execution uncertainty, since trade at the
limit price is not guaranteed; and (ii) adverse selection (also known as a “pick-oﬀ”r i s k ) ,
realized when better informed market participants take advantage of slow (or less informed)
limit order traders. Limit order traders need analytical tools for eﬃcient management of these
risks. In particular, models that predict the possible outcomes (execution or cancellation) of
their orders given these two types of risk should be of beneﬁt to such traders. In this paper
we will develop three general classes of models, separately for buy and sell orders, and study
their properties.
Duration of limit order (deﬁned as the time interval between the limit order arrival
and its termination) plays an important role in the determination of transactions cost and
1See Henker and Martens (2003), Peterson and Sirri (2002), Biais et al. (1995, 1999).
2Notable exceptions are Lo et al (2002) and Holliﬁeld et al (forthcoming).
1opportunity cost of limit orders. Although a limit order trader does not face the price risk
associated with a market order, at the time of limit order submission it is unknown how long
it will take to ﬁll the order, and whether the limit order will be executed at all. Expected limit
order execution and cancellation times also aﬀect market liquidity and are likely to be major
factors driving the dynamics of the bid-ask spread. Lo et al. (2002) estimate an econometric
model for the conditional distribution of limit order execution times as a function of economic
variables such as the limit price, order size, and current market conditions. They ﬁnd that
limit order execution times are very sensitive to the limit price, but are not sensitive to limit
order size. In a related strand of literature, Bisière and Kamionka (2000) and Tyurin (2003)
use the competing risk methodology popular in survival analysis to model the hazard rates of
order arrival, execution, and cancellation on limit order markets. Their models can be viewed
as price formation models, which capture the interaction between quotes, transactions, and
cancellation events in ﬁnancial markets. In a study that is most closely related to this one,
Holliﬁeld et al (forthcoming) consider both executions and cancellations of limit orders on
the Vancouver Stock Exchange to estimate gains from trade in a limit order trading platform.
In spite of the relative lack of focus on limit order cancellations, it is interesting to
note that cancellation events represent the most common cause of limit order termination
in modern electronic limit order markets. For example, according to Hasbrouck and Saar
(2004) more than 80% of all limit orders submitted on Island ECN do not receive execution
and are ultimately cancelled. Yeo (2004) reports that approximately 40% of all limit orders
submitted on NYSE in 2001 were cancelled. Ellul et. al. (2003) and Lo and Sapp (2005)
examine the determinants of order choice strategies of investors, including the option to
cancel previously placed limit orders, while Yeo (2004) studies investors’ strategies after
cancellation of limit orders. All three papers are implemented in a discrete time framework
and use discrete choice models to study traders’ decisions.
In this paper we further investigate executions and cancellations of limit orders, extending
the previous studies in several directions. We analyze recent data from the INET trading
platform — a completely automated limit order book. We use the ITCH R ° data feed, which
contains information on the entry, processing, and execution of all orders submitted to INET.
T h er i c ha n dd e t a i l e dd a t ai nt h eI T C HR ° ﬁles allow us to investigate the relationship between
the duration times and alternative outcomes of limit orders, and study the dependence of
duration times on order characteristics and market conditions.
We ﬁnd that of the various models we empirically test, the Weibull proportional hazard
model with independent competing risks best describes the times to limit order executions
and cancellations. Our results agree with previous ﬁndings and intuition. Time-to-execution
is found to be more sensitive to the limit price variation than time-to-cancellation, even
2though it is less sensitive to the limit order size. Therefore, a safe way to reduce the time-
to-execution for both buy and sell orders with a minimal increase in non-execution risk is
to increase the price aggressiveness of the order. More importantly, investors who aim to
reduce the expected time-to-execution for their limit orders without inducing any signiﬁcant
increase in the risk of subsequent cancellation should submit their orders when the market
depth is smaller on the side of their orders or when the market depth is greater on the
opposite side of their orders.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, in a continuous
time framework we model jointly the limit order cancellation and execution events. From an
econometric perspective, the process of limit order execution is best approached by the use of
competing risk models that are popular in the survival analysis literature. In the competing
risks framework, several risk factors compete against each other for the termination event.
After a limit order is placed, the limit order can be executed, cancelled/modiﬁed, or expires
if expiration time is provided. Therefore, the execution and cancellation outcomes can be
treated as competing risks, and the expiration outcome can be treated as a censoring time
for those competing risks. Our models allow us to capture the information in cancellations,
in addition to executions of limit orders.
Second, we treat limit order cancellation as a random event rather than an investor’s
choice as in Ellul et al. (2003) or as a censoring event as in Lo et al. (2002). Although
traders are free to choose whether and when to cancel the limit orders they submit, they
might have little if any knowledge at the time of order submission as to whether their orders
would be ultimately cancelled or executed. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider cancellation
as an additional risk that could cause the termination of a limit order.
Third, the competing risk model allows us to obtain diﬀerent eﬀects of the explanatory
variables on diﬀerent risks. This is not only of academic interest but also has useful practical
implications. For example, if an investor increases her limit price for a buy limit order, then
the probability of the order being executed is increased. But at the same time, she conveys
information to the market by increasing the limit buy price, indicating that her private
valuation of the asset is high. In response, other investors might place more aggressive limit
orders or marketable limit orders, and the bid-ask spread changes accordingly. This causes
changes in the market conditions, which might induce the investor who placed the limit
order at the beginning to cancel her order, submit a new one, or stay away from the market
altogether. Thus, an increase in the limit order price might also increase the probability of
later cancellation. Our methodology recognizes this interdependence, and provides a way for
investors to develop optimal limit order submission strategies. Modeling this interdependence
is a contribution of our methodology.
3Fourth, we test several competing models that can be used to analyze limit order exe-
cutions and cancellations jointly. We consider three general classes of models: (a) Weibull
proportional hazard model with independent competing risks, (b) the Accelerated Failure
Time (AFT) model, and (c) Gamma Frailty model. Weibull is the most popular model
speciﬁcation in duration analysis, AFT is used to benchmark against the ﬁndings of Lo et.
al (2002), and ﬁnally we consider the case where the two competing risks, execution and
cancellation, depend on each other through an unobserved latent variable (frailty). Frailty
allows us to control for the unobserved heterogeneity of limit orders and market conditions,
and is an important econometric issue. Unobserved heterogeneity refers to the factors that
are observed by investors placing the orders but unobserved (or uncaptured) by the econo-
metrician. In general, failure to control unobserved heterogeneity in empirical research could
severely bias the estimates for the parameters of interest and yield misleading conclusions
and strategy recommendations (Lancaster, 1990). We introduce diagnostic plots as a useful
method of verifying the goodness-of-ﬁt for all three models.
Last but not least, our empirical data covers a very recent period in which we have
Regulation NMS, decimal pricing, and even subpenny pricing for some stocks. Chung et al.
(2004) and Chakravarty et al. (2004) studied the impact of decimalization on transaction
costs, market quality and liquidity, and found that quoted depth as well as the quoted and
eﬀective bid-ask spreads declined signiﬁcantly following decimalization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the econometric model.
We introduce the data, explanatory variables, and provide their summary statistics in Sec-
tion III. Section IV discusses empirical results and their implications. Section V describes
goodness-of-ﬁt diagnostics of the alternative models. A brief summary and an outline for
future research conclude this paper in Section VI. The technical derivations are relegated to
the Appendix.
II. The Econometric Model
To develop an econometric model for the times to limit order execution and cancellation,
it is important not only to distinguish between these two causes of limit order termination,
but also incorporate all observed characteristics of the limit order and capture the inﬂuence
of market conditions at the time of the limit order submission. We accomplish this through
the application of a well-known statistical technique — competing risks analysis.
Competing risks analysis is typically applied in situations where we have multiple fail-
ure types. A prototypical competing risks situation was ﬁrst considered in the eighteenth
4century when small pox vaccination was discovered and popularized.3 For many years, com-
peting risks models have been a popular tool for analyses of failure time data in various
disciplines, such as biostatistics, medicine, and engineering. Recently the competing risks
model found numerous applications in actuarial science, criminal justice, economics, ﬁnance,
and many other areas. Following the seminal papers of Heckman and Honoré (1989), Han
and Hausman (1990), Sueyoshi (1992), and McCall (1996), competing risks models became
popular in the economic analysis of time to an economic event, where the duration intervals
can have multiple causes of termination. For example, an unemployment spell may end due
to transition out of unemployment into either a new job or recall. Similarly, a mortgage
loan contract can terminate because of the homeowner’s default or prepayment of the loan.4
In the context of duration analysis of limit orders, we intend to capture the eﬀects of
market-wide conditions and order-speciﬁc characteristics, such as the level of market activity,
stock price volatility, limit order price, limit order size, bid and ask quotes, market depth,
and other covariates, on the survival probability of limit orders. For diﬀerent risks of failure,
these variables may have diﬀerent eﬀects, in magnitude and direction, on the risk-speciﬁc
limit order duration. There are several empirical papers on limit orders that extensively use
a single risk analysis, but little work has been done in a multiple risks framework.
The idea behind our econometric model can be best explained using the latent failure
time approach. Often one wishes to analyze the failure time data where one of the several
mutually exclusive causes (or types) of failure (i.e. competing risks) is assigned as the reason
for the failure.5 Since in most real life situations one cannot observe each of the latent causes
of failure separately (e.g., the diﬀerent possible causes of death; types of recidivism among
released prisoners; possible reasons for ending a spell of unemployment), each individual
survival time can be interpreted as if it represents a component of an unobserved random
vector of survival times associated with diﬀerent causes of failure (risks). The failure can
happen because of any of these competing risks. The system is said to have failed because of
the cause (or type) that happens to realize ﬁrst. The lack of observability of the underlying
paths of each component of the random vector of failure times and the posterior knowledge
of the cause that actually triggers the failure justify the term “latent” duration. So, one can
only observe the shortest time to failure and the cause (or type) of that failure.
3Daniel Bernoulli (1766) posed the question: “How much would the mortality be reduced or expected life
be increased if the risk of death due to small pox is totally eliminated, the other risks persisting as before?”
4Ciochetti et al. (2003) applies the proportional hazard model with competing risks to the analysis of
time to termination of commercial mortgage contacts.
5In some studies more complicated failure patterns may emerge. In the current framework, such patterns
may be handled by deﬁning additional failure types. For example, in our application to the limit order
market, a limit order might be partially executed, with the remainder of the order staying on the book and
being cancelled eventually.
5Formally, let T1,T 2,...,T m denote the latent failure times of an individual subjected to
m competing risks. What is actually observed is the time to failure T =m i n( T1,T 2,...,T m)
and the cause of failure J =a r g m i n
j=1,2,...,m
Tj.6 Denote by δ the right-censoring indicator (δ =0
if censored, δ =1if uncensored) and denote by Tc the right-censoring time.7 Often it is
also useful to assume that the sample includes only the orders that have survived by time t0
since the beginning of the duration episode, which implies that the observed times to failure
are larger than t0. In summary, observation for the ith individual included in the sample
is either in the form (ti,j i,δi =1 )or (ti,δi =0 ), where ti ∈ (t0;tci] is the realized time to
failure in the uncensored case, and ti = tci is the censoring time if observation i is censored.
In our context, for each uncensored observation of a limit order, its termination can
be triggered by two mutually exclusive competing risks: execution and cancellation.8 We
observe the duration to one and only one of those two causes, whichever occurs ﬁrst. Hence,
the observed survival time is T =m i n ( T1,T 2),w h e r e(T1,T 2) is the random vector of the
two underlying failure times of the limit order. In addition, we observe the cause of the
termination J, which can be execution (J =1 ) or cancellation (J =2 ). As a result, the
random vector (T,J) gives us the observable part of our data. Let T>t 0 and assume that
the random vector (T1,T 2) has a well deﬁned absolutely continuous distribution function.
Then the joint survival function
S (t1,t 2|t0)=P r {T1 >t 1,T 2 >t 2|T1 >t 0,T 2 >t 0} (1)
is deﬁned as the joint probability that the limit order surviving by time t0 will not be
terminated due to cause 1 (not executed) until time t1 >t 0 and will not be terminated due
to cause 2 (not cancelled) until time t2 >t 0.
The sample censoring is said to exist when certain subsets of the population cannot be
sampled, but the econometrician either knows or can consistently estimate the probability of
not sampling this subset of the population. Here, censored observations may correspond to
6Random variables T1,T 2,...,T m are assumed to have continuous distribution, so that the cause of failure
J is uniquely deﬁned.
7The realizations of random variable Tc can vary across limit orders and generally depend on the market
conditions. However, for day limit orders considered in this paper it is useful to assume that the right-
censoring occurs at 4 p.m. EST or 10 minutes after the limit order submission, whichever comes ﬁrst. Since
the time of such right-censoring is known in advance, this censoring scheme can be considered deterministic.
Note that although INET operates after the major exchanges close, we do not consider the extended hours
in our analysis since market quality in the after hours is diﬀerent from the regular trading hours (Barclay
and Hendershott, 2003).
8In this paper we focus on the bivariate case, and assume that there are only two distinct causes of limit
order termination. Generalization to the multivariate case is conceptually straightforward. Implementation
of the multivariate competing risks model, possibly including revised and resubmitted orders, is left for future
analysis.
6the limit orders staying on the book until the end of the analyzed time interval or duration
episode without being executed or cancelled. Even though neither execution nor cancellation
events can be observed for such limit orders within the duration episode, partial information
is still available. Speciﬁcally, it is known that limit order i survived by the censoring time
tci corresponding to the duration between the time of limit order submission and the end of
the analyzed duration episode. The probability of right-censoring for limit order i can then
be expressed in terms of its joint survival function as follows
Pr{δi =0 |T1i >t 0,T 2i >t 0} = S (tci,t ci|t0). (2)
Assuming in the above setup that the censoring rule is deﬁned exogenously, the log-





[(1 − δi)lnS (tci,t ci|t0)+δi lnf (ti,j i|t0)], (3)
where δi ∈ {0,1}, ti ∈ (t0,t ci], ji ∈ {1,2} are the sample observations indexed by i =




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
t1=t2=t
,j =1 ,2. (4)
It can be clearly seen from the expression (3) that to carry out the likelihood-based estimation
one only needs to specify the bivariate survival function S (t1,t 2|t0). Equivalently, one can
specify F (t1,t 2|t0), the joint distribution function of (T1,T 2) for limit orders surviving at least
t0 seconds since the onset of the duration episode, or the joint density function f (t1,t 2|t0).
Indeed, the values of S (t1,t 2|t0) and F (t1,t 2|t0) are linked by the following relationship10
S (t1,t 2|t0)=F(tc,t c|t0)−F (t1,t c|t0)−F(tc,t 2|t0)+F (t1,t 2|t0), (t1,t 2) ∈ (t0,t ci]×(t0,t ci].
(5)
In the analysis of failure time data, researchers often prefer to specify the cumulative
hazard rate H(t1,t 2|t0)=−ln(S(t1,t 2|t0)), providing yet another way to characterize the
underlying distribution of the bivariate failure times. Often there are compelling reasons
to model the cumulative hazard rate directly, as it may be more convenient to think of the
limit order as a survivor subjected at any moment of its lifetime to instantaneous risks,
characterized by partial derivatives of the joint cumulative hazard function. Formally, the
9See the Appendix for derivation of formula (3).
10See the Appendix for derivation of formula (5).








P (t ≤ Tj <t+ 4t|Tj ≥ t>t 0)
4t
,j =1 ,2. (6)
In other words, the cause-speciﬁc hazard rates hj (t|t0) (j =1 ,2) can be viewed as the
instantaneous rates of type j failure at time t, t ∈ (t0;tci).








and the following relationship between S (t1,t 2|t0) and h1 (t|t0) and h2 (t|t0) holds true11











Therefore, in the case of independent competing risks, it would be suﬃcient to specify the
two cause-speciﬁc hazard functions hj (t), j =1 ,2.12
Finally, it must be emphasized that the above discussion can be reformulated in terms of
the conditional joint distribution function F (t1,t 2|t0,z), conditional joint survival functions
S (t1,t 2|t0,z), conditional joint hazard rate H (t1,t 2|t0,z)=−ln(S(t1,t 2|t0,z)),a sw e l la s
conditional risk-speciﬁc densities f (t,j|t0,z) or risk-speciﬁc hazard rates hj (t|t0,z), j =1 ,2,
given the vector of exogenous covariates Z = z. Components of the covariate vector z may
include attributes of the limit order such as its size and transparency, as well as the variables
characterizing the market conditions at the time of limit order submission.
III. Data
We use a sample of four randomly selected stocks — American Capital Strategies Ltd.
(ACAS), Associated BanCorp (ASBC), Imclone Systems Inc. (IMCL), and Career Edu-
cation Corp (CECO), — and the stock of Intel Corp (INTC), which is one of the most liquid
equities traded on US markets. The sample period is July—December, 2005. We estimate
and test our competing risk models using order book data for these ﬁve stocks from INET.
INET is an automated limit order platform for trading equities. Thus, unlike the NYSE
11See the Appendix for derivation of formula (8).
12Later in this paper we will relax the conditional independence assumption for the competing risks by
specifying the unobserved factor V aﬀecting the joint hazard rate multiplicatively. It will be shown that the
survival function obtained by integrating V out of the formula will imply dependence between the latent
durations of the competing risks.
8or NASDAQ, trading on INET is completely order driven. INET is open when the U.S.
equity markets are open, and generally accepts orders between 7 a.m. and 8 p.m. EST.
Only broker-dealers can submit orders to INET, and the only type of order allowed is limit
order, which can be either open for display or hidden. A trader who wants an immediate
INET execution can place a marketable limit order that meets or crosses the best price on
the opposite side of the limit order book. A trader who is prepared to wait and deal with
uncertainty of INET execution can place a non-marketable limit order that does not hit the
best price instantaneously available on the opposite side of the limit order book.
Upon receiving an order and performing a series of checks to establish its validity, the
INET trading system scans its limit order book to determine if a matching order is present
in the system. If a matching order is found, the incoming order is executed immediately. If a
matching order for the newly arrived display order does not exist, the display order is placed
on the limit order book and remains visible until a matching order is received or until the
display order originally submitted to the system is cancelled. If the newly arrived order was
entered as a non-display (hidden) order, and a matching order is not available immediately,
the non-display order is also placed on the electronic limit order book but remains hidden
from view by other traders. All unmatched orders are automatically cleared from the book
at the end of the trading day.
The INET electronic trading platform matches incoming orders with existing orders in
the book based on the following priorities:
(a) Price: the limit order price speciﬁed at the time of order arrival,
(b) Display: non-display (hidden) orders have lower execution priority than display
orders with the same limit order price, and
(c) Time: the exact time of limit order arrival (in milliseconds).
The information from the ITCH R ° database that is relevant for our empirical work is as
follows: the limit order reference number, the limit price, size, time stamps (in milliseconds)
at order entry, execution information (partial or complete, as can be inferred by compar-
ing the order reference numbers), cancellation (partial or complete, as can be inferred by
comparing the order reference numbers). We follow Odders-White (2000) in inferring the
buy-sell direction of orders by assuming that the initiator of a transaction is the investor
who places his or her order last, chronologically. To construct the National Best Bid and
Oﬀer (NBBO) quotes, we use quote data from the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database.
A. Data Cleaning
To reduce the inﬂuence of outliers and data errors, we apply the following ﬁlters to the raw
ITCH R ° data:
9(1) We conﬁne our analysis to buy and sell limit orders submitted between 10 a.m. to
4 p.m. EST. The orders that are not executed or cancelled before 4 p.m. EST are treated
as right-censored observations. The beginning time of 10 a.m. EST is chosen because some
o ft h ec o v a r i a t e st h a tw ea r eg o i n gt ou s ea r eb a s e do nt h ep r e v i o u sh o u r ’ sl i m i to r d e rb o o k
activity. Since the dynamics of limit order executions and cancellations are believed to be
driven by a diﬀerent set of factors for orders submitted after 4 p.m. EST (the market closing
time for major US-based exchanges), such limit orders are also not covered by the analysis
in the present paper.13
(2) For each submitted limit order, we classify its termination event as execution or
cancellation and compute its failure time. We treat all partially executed limit orders as
executed orders, no matter whether they are subsequently fully executed or cancelled after
one or several partial executions. Therefore, the failure time of a limit order is deﬁned
as the time to its ﬁrst ﬁll (partial or complete) or, if no executions are reported, to its
cancellation. The limit orders that are not executed and not cancelled within 10 minutes
after their submission are treated as right-censored observations.
( 3 )W ed e l e t ea l lo r d e r sw i t hl i m i tp r i c em o r et h a n$0.25 away from the bid-ask mid-quote
at the time of submission,14 since we believe that such distant limit orders have a diﬀerent set
of factors driving their execution and cancellation dynamics. The median distance between
the mid-quote and limit order price for our sample is $0.025, while the 99% percentile of
this variable is $0.21. Therefore, limit orders with the distance between mid-quote and the
limit price larger than $0.25 are quite rare and can be treated as outliers that should be
approached with a separate model.
(4) All orders with durations less than or equal to two seconds are excluded. It should be
emphasized that over 90% of limit orders in our data set are terminated with cancellations
and most of these cancellations occur within two seconds or less since the time of limit order
submission. We exclude such ﬂeeting limit orders15 from our sample and set t0 =2seconds
in all formulas of Section II used in the subsequent analysis. Executions and cancellations
that occur shortly after submission of a limit order require a separate model since their
dynamics are likely to be driven by factors diﬀerent from those for the limit orders surviving
at least two seconds.
13See Barclay and Hendershott (2003) for a discussion of after-hours trading.
14The distance between the limit order price and the bid-ask mid-quote is captured by the covariate
MQLP deﬁned below. The bid-ask mid-quote is calculated from the NBBO quotes.
15Hasbrouck and Saar (2004) provide more information on ﬂeeting limit orders.
10B. Covariates
The covariates (exogenous or pre-determined explanatory variables) are chosen to capture
the eﬀect of limit order characteristics and market conditions prevailing at the time of order
arrival on the time-to-execution and time-to-cancellation of the limit order. Therefore, the
dependence between execution and cancellation risks is partially captured by the covari-
ates included in the model. The residual dependence between the two risks is due to the
unobserved factors, which can be viewed as the covariates left out of the model.
Deﬁne Pl as the limit order price, Pb and Po as the NBBO quotes, Pq ≡ 1
2(Pb+Po) as the
NBBO mid-quote, Sb and So as the number of round lots (100 shares) available at the NBBO
quotes, Sl as the limit order size measured in round lots, and BSID as the buy/sell indicator
of the previous transaction. Similar to Lo et al. (2002), in the buy limit order models we
use the following covariates that are all measured at the time of limit order submission16
MQLP =1 0 0 ( Pq − Pl),
BSID =
(
1 if last trade was a sell trade,
−1 if last trade was a buy trade,
MKD1=
(
ln(Sb)(1 + 100(Pb − Pl)) if Pl ≤ Pb,
0 if Pl >P b,
MKD2=
(
ln(So)/(1 + 100(Po − Pl)) if Po ≥ Pl,





ln(Sl)(1 + 100(Po − Pl)) if Po >P l,
ln(Sl − So) if Po = Pl and Sl >S o,
0 otherwise,
STKV =
# of trades in the last half-hour
# of trades in the last hour
,
TURN =l n ( # of trades in the last hour), (9)
T h r e eo ft h ea b o v ec o v a r i a t e sa r er e d e ﬁned for the sell limit-order models in order to retain
uniformity in the underlying interpretation of these variables. The redeﬁned covariates are
16As discussed in Section VI, this paper applies only to the case of exogenous covariates that are assumed
to be ﬁxed or predetermined at the time of limit order submission. Extending the analysis to the case of




ln(So)(1 + 100(Pl − Po)) if Pl ≥ Po,
0 if Pl <P o,
MKD2=
(
ln(Sb)/(1 + 100(Pl − Pb)) Pb ≤ Pl,





ln(Sl)(1 + 100(Pl − Pb)) Pl >P b,
ln(Sl − Sb) Pl = Pb and Sl >S b,
0 otherwise.
(10)
T h ec o v a r i a t e sd e ﬁned above attempt to capture the current state of the market and
accommodate the dynamic nature of the marketplace. The variable MQLP measures the
distance between the limit order price and the NBBO mid-quote at the time of limit order
submission. BSID is an indicator of whether the prior transaction was buyer-initiated or
seller-initiated, determined using the Odders-White (2000) chronology test. BSID equals
1( −1) if the last trade in TAQ database was a seller (buyer)-initiated trade. MKD1 is a
proxy for the minimum number of shares that have a higher priority of execution. MKD2
measures liquidity on the opposite side of the market. SZSD is a measure of liquidity
demanded by the marketable limit order scaled by the distance between the limit order price
and the best quote on the opposite side of the market. STKV is a variable that attempts
to capture the lower-frequency shifts in the absolute level of trading activity; it indirectly
approximates the ﬂuctuations of market volatility at the intraday frequencies comparable to
common time horizons of limit order traders. TURN is an absolute measure of past trading
activity. As previously mentioned, some of these variables are created from the TAQ data
set. In the process of merging ITCH R ° data and TAQ data, we assume that the time stamps
in the two data sets are consistent with each other.17
C. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for the ﬁve stocks analyzed in this paper. It shows
the average daily number of outcomes for buy and sell limit orders and some characteristics
of daily trading activity in each stock. Note that the reported statistics are for the orders
that survive at least two seconds since their submission. Each of the ﬁve stocks have well over
half million observations (buy and sell limit orders) for the sample period (July—December
2005).18 More than 90% of all orders get cancelled, and most execution and cancellation
17See Chakrabarty et al. (2005) for details on mapping ITCH R ° to TAQ times.
18Our sample contains 588,000 observations for ACAS, 685,000 observations for ASBC stock, almost
979,000 observations for IMCL stock, and more than 1.16 mln. observations for CECO stock. The INTL
12events occur within the ﬁrst several seconds of order arrival. The price averages for our
sample securities range between $25 and $40 per share. More than half of all executions for
the four moderately liquid stocks chosen for this study have small size (100 shares), even
though the market depth available at the best bid and ask quotes is typically between 400
and 800 shares. For the most liquid stock, INTC, the median transaction size is 300 shares,
and the median market depth available at the best bid and ask quotes is around 26,000
shares. The average bid-ask spread for the four moderately liquid stocks is slightly higher
than two ticks, which means that the competing limit order traders can typically oﬀer a one
tick price improvement without making their limit orders marketable. Two of the stocks
(ACAS and ASBC) are low-volatility stocks, whereas two other stocks (IMCL and CECO)
are high-volatility stocks. As expected, the realized volatility of the four chosen stocks tends
to increase as the sampling frequency goes up from monthly to hourly, suggesting the presence
of substantial microstructure noise. On the other hand, the realized volatility of the INTC
stock is practically invariant to the sampling frequency, suggesting very little microstructure
noise even at the hourly frequency.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for durations and covariates used in the
estimation of alternative competing risks models for the ACAS stock. Note that Table 2
and the subsequent Tables 3—6 report the estimation results for the single stock — ACAS
— using the subsamples for two months only (July and December of 2005). We summarize
the results for all sample stocks and time intervals in Table 7. The properties of durations
for buy and sell limit orders appear to be very similar. For example, the median duration
time for ACAS buy limit orders (13.66 seconds) is almost identical to the one for sell limit
orders (13.64 seconds). As expected, the diﬀerence between the limit order price and the
market mid-quote has diﬀerent signs for buy and sell orders due to the deﬁnition of the
covariate MQLP. The average distance between the limit order price and the mid-quote of
the bid-ask spread is close to three ticks ($0.03). The properties of other covariates are also
very similar for buy and sell limit orders. Notice that most covariates are slightly (and some
signiﬁcantly) leptokurtic and skewed.
I V .E s t i m a t i o nR e s u l t sa n dI n t e r p r e t a t i o no fP a r a m e t e r s
A. Model Speciﬁcation
As explained in Section II, it is suﬃcient for estimation of the competing risks model in the
range of durations t>t 0 to specify its joint conditional survival function S (t1,t 2|t0,z) used
in the expression of the log-likelihood function (3). Equivalently, one can start with the
stock stands out with more than 10.64 mln. observations.
13speciﬁcation of the joint conditional distribution function F (t1,t 2|t0,z) or joint conditional
cumulative hazard rate H (t1,t 2|t0,z), and then derive the function S (t1,t 2|t0,z).19 In this
section, we oﬀer three alternative speciﬁcations of the conditional survival function that are
subsequently used in our empirical analysis. First we discuss two speciﬁcations where the
underlying risk-speciﬁcd u r a t i o n sT1 and T2 are assumed to be conditionally independent,
and then turn to our last speciﬁcation where the risk-speciﬁcd u r a t i o nT1 and T2 depend on
a common unobserved risk factor.
A.1. Generalized Gamma AFT Model with Independent Risks
We adopt the accelerated failure time (AFT) speciﬁcation of Lo et al. (2002)
Tj = T0j exp(z
0
βj),j =1 ,2, (11)
where T0j is the risk-speciﬁc baseline failure time, z is a vector of covariates that capture
market-wide conditions and limit order characteristics, βj is a risk-speciﬁc parameter vector.
The distribution of T0j is called the baseline distribution. The risk-speciﬁc durations Tj are
modeled as scaled transformations of the baseline failure times T0j, where the covariates and
the parameter values determine the degree of scaling. If we assume that the baseline failure
times T0j have generalized gamma distribution with shape parameters κj and pj, then the
risk-speciﬁc conditional survival functions for the risk-speciﬁc durations Tj >t 0 (j =1 .2)
are given by
Sj (t|t0,z;ωj)=
1{pj > 0}·Γ(κj) − sign(pj) · Γ(κj,(texp(−z
0βj))pjκj)






0 is the parameter vector, 1{·} is the indicator function which takes
the value of 1 if the statement in parentheses is valid and 0 otherwise, sign(·) is the sign







i st h ei n c o m p l e t eg a m m af u n c t i o n ,a n dΓ(a) ≡ Γ(a,∞) is the complete gamma function.
The corresponding density functions for the risk-speciﬁc conditional durations Tj are positive
19In fact, it is suﬃcient to specify any of these functions in a small neighborhood of the main diagonal
t1 = t2 on the latent duration space.








1{pj > 0}·Γ(κj) − sign(pj) · Γ(κj,(t0 exp(−z
0βj))pjκj)
. (14)
The generalized gamma distribution is chosen since it nests a number of other popular
distributions (gamma, Weibull, log-normal) as special cases. Since T1 and T2 are assumed to
be independent, given the observed covariates z and starting time t0, the joint conditional
survival function S (t1,t 2|t0,z) is obtained as
S (t1,t 2|t0,z;ω1,ω2)=S1 (t|t0,z;ω1)S2 (t|t0,z;ω2),t 1 >t 0,t 2 >t 0, (15)
where Sj (t|t0,z;ωj), j =1 ,2,a r et h er i s k - s p e c i ﬁc conditional survival functions deﬁned by
(12).
A.2. Weibull and Cox Proportional Hazard Models with Independent Risks
Alternatively, if we pursue the hazard function approach, a popular fully parametric speciﬁ-
cation for the risk-speciﬁc conditional hazard rates is provided by the Weibull proportional
hazard model. In this speciﬁcation, it is assumed that the risk-speciﬁc hazard rates hj (t|t0,z)
(j =1 ,2) are conditionally independent of each other at all times t>t 0, given the observed








0 are the model parameters (j =1 ,2).
In this setup, the joint survival function for risk-speciﬁc durations T1 and T2 conditional
on the observed covariates z and starting time t0 can be obtained as follows20



















For estimation, the expression (17) is plugged into the expression (3) of the log-likelihood
function.
The Weibull proportional hazard speciﬁcation (16) and (17) is a fully parametric model.
The parameter estimates based on this speciﬁcation are eﬃcient if the model is correct but
would be biased if the model is misspeciﬁed. If the assumption that T1 and T2 are condi-
tionally independent given the observed covariates z and starting time t0 is maintained, one
20Derivation of formula (17) is given in the Appendix.
15can use the Cox proportional hazard model, which is robust to the Weibull baseline hazard
misspeciﬁcation. The Cox proportional hazard model, due to Cox (1972), has a long his-
tory of use in medical statistics and biostatistics, and it also gained popularity in economics
and ﬁnance. Similar to the Weibull proportional hazard model, the Cox proportional haz-
ard model is formulated for the risk-speciﬁc conditional hazard rates. It assumes that the
risk-speciﬁc conditional hazard rates at time t>t 0 are given by
hj(t|t0,z,βj)=h0j (t|t0)exp(z
0
βj),t > t 0,j=1 ,2, (18)
where z is the vector of observed covariates and h0j (t|t0) are the covariate-free risk-speciﬁc
baseline hazard rates. The Cox proportional hazard model is semiparametric since no as-
sumptions (other than mild regularity conditions) are made about the shape of the baseline
hazard rates h0j (t|t0).
Cox (1972) shows that inference on the covariate eﬀects βj (j =1 ,2)i nt h eC o xp r o -
portional hazard model can be based on the partial likelihood function instead of the full
likelihood derived in Section II. Moreover, since the Cox proportional hazard competing risks
model includes, as a special case, the proportional hazard model with Weibull independent
risks, we can compare the estimates of covariate coeﬃcients coming from the two models. If
the coeﬃcient vectors b β1 and b β2 coming from the two models are close to each other, the
Weibull proportional hazard assumption is justiﬁed (at least indirectly) and can be accepted
as a good working hypothesis.21 To this end, we also estimate the Cox proportional hazard
model with conditionally independent competing risks and report our estimation results in
Table 5.
A.3. Weibull Proportional Hazard Model with Gamma Frailty
In the last two subsections, we maintained the assumption that T1 and T2 are conditionally
independent given the observed covariates z and the starting time t0. However, allowing
T1 and T2 to be dependent given the observed covariates often may be a more realistic
assumption. For example, if there are some economic factors that could plausibly aﬀect the
times to limit order execution and cancellation but cannot be incorporated in the model
as components of the covariate vector z, then the risk-speciﬁc durations T1 and T2 would
be dependent random variables, even after their dependence on the observed covariates is
controlled. Our last model speciﬁcation allows for such a possibility.
In this speciﬁcation, we assume that the risk-speciﬁc hazard rates at time t are indepen-
dent of each other, provided that not only the covariate vector z but also the value of an
21A formal speciﬁcation test similar to the standard Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) can also be applied.
16additional latent factor (frailty) V are observed. We assume the following speciﬁcation for




βj),j =1 ,2, (19)
where z is the vector of observed covariates, v is the value of latent factor V realized at




0 are the model parameters as in the Weibull proportional hazard model (16).
As a consequence of dependence on the common factor V , the risk-speciﬁc hazard rates
hj(t|z;θj), t>t 0, j =1 ,2, will be dependent given the observed covariates z only, and hence
the risk-speciﬁc durations T1 and T2 will also be dependent conditional on the observed
covariates and the starting time t0.
If we assume that random variable V has gamma distribution with mean ταand variance
















is the vector of its scale and shape parameters, then the joint survival
function for T1 and T2 conditional only on the observed covariate vector z (given that the



























is the vector of model parameters.23 As usual, the expression
(21) can be plugged into the formula (3) to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the
model parameters.
B. Estimation Results
Each of the models discussed in the previous section is estimated twice — once for buy orders
and once for sell orders. In our interpretation of the estimation results, we distinguish
between two modeling schemes. In the accelerated failure time (AFT) framework, where we
model the risk-speciﬁc conditional durations directly, positive estimated values of covariate
22Derivation of formula (21) can be found in the Appendix.
23It can be inferred from the expression of log-likelihood function (3) based on formulas (19) and (21)
that parameters τ and α cannot be identiﬁed simultaneously. Imposing a restriction on parameter τ (for
instance, τ =1 ) makes the competing risks model based on the gamma frailty just-identiﬁed and leads to a
well-deﬁned maximum of the log-likelihood function.
17eﬀects imply that larger values of those covariates are associated with longer risk-speciﬁc
durations. In the second approach, where we model the risk-speciﬁc conditional hazard
rates, the interpretation of covariate eﬀects is opposite. Positive estimated values of covariate
eﬀects imply that an increase in those covariates tends to increase the risk-speciﬁc conditional
hazard rate and decrease the expected time to realization of the risk under consideration.
Estimation results based on July 2005 and December 2005 subsamples of limit orders
for alternative competing risks model speciﬁcations are reported in Tables 3—6 for the ticker
ACAS; summary results for the entire sample are provided in Table 7. The following dis-
cussion is based on the estimates for ACAS limit order data in July 2005. As emphasized in
the discussion of Section III, only the orders submitted no further than $0.25 away from the
current NBBO mid-quote, between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. EST are considered. In addition,
orders with less than two-second durations are eliminated and all limit orders with durations
larger than 10 minutes are assumed to be right-censored at 600 seconds. Similarly, any limit
order that survives by 4 p.m. EST is assumed to be right-censored at the duration equal to
the time interval between 4 p.m. and the time of this limit order submission. Additionally,
as a robustness check, we report all estimation results based on the ACAS limit order data
in December 2005. At the end of this section we brieﬂy discuss robustness of our estimates
across stocks and time periods.24
B.1. Generalized Gamma AFT Model with Independent Risks
Table 3 reports parameter estimates of the generalized gamma accelerated failure time model
for buy and sell orders, along with their t-statistics. Note that the eﬀect of covariate MQLP
associated for the execution risk of buy (sell) limit orders equals +0.99 (−1.14) and is highly
signiﬁcant, whereas the same covariate eﬀect for the cancellation risk of buy (sell) limit orders
is only +0.05 (+0.01) with a much smaller t-ratio. This demonstrates that the further away
the limit order price is relative to the midquote level, the longer it takes to execute the order,
and the sooner that order would be cancelled.
The positive sign (+0.12)o nt h ec o v a r i a t ee ﬀect of BSID for the buy limit order time
to execution suggests that if the prior trade occurred below the current midquote (BSID =
−1), then the smaller time to execution of that buy limit order is expected. The covariate
eﬀect of BSID for the buy limit order cancellation risk is quantitatively small, which suggests
that the high-frequency mean reversal eﬀect, which is apparently quite substantial for the
execution risk, is negligible for the cancellation risk of buy limit orders.
The positive coeﬃcients (+0.32 and +0.04)o nt h ec o v a r i a t ee ﬀects of MKD1 indicate
that the time-to-execution and the time-to-cancellation of a buy limit order are both in-
24Detailed estimates for all ﬁv es t o c k sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
18creasing with the amount of liquidity provided on the same side of the market with a higher
price and time priority. The coeﬃcient is much larger for execution risk, which leads to
the tentative conclusion that the deeper market on the buy side would be associated with
a higher percentage of cancellations (relative to executions) of the buy orders submitted at
the inferior limit order prices.
On the other hand, the negative coeﬃcient (−0.21)( t h ep o s i t i v ec o e ﬃcient (+0.01))
on the covariate eﬀect of MKD2 indicate that the time-to-execution (time-to-cancellation)
of a buy limit order is decreasing (increasing) with the amount of liquidity provided on
the opposite side of the market and with the distance between the buy limit order price
and the best oﬀer quote available on the opposite side. To put it diﬀerently, the increasing
competition among the sellers implies shorter time-to-execution (longer time-to-cancellation)
for the outstanding buy limit orders.
Since SZSD is a measure of liquidity demanded by the buy limit order trader scaled by
its price aggressiveness, we expect the coeﬃcient of that variable on time-to-ﬁrst-execution
o ft h eb u yl i m i to r d e rt ob en e g a t i v e .T h i si se x a c t l yt h ec a s ea sw eo b s e r v et h ec o v a r i a t e
eﬀect for SZSD associated with the execution risk to be negative (−0.05). Interestingly, the
eﬀect of SZSD on time-to-cancellation is also negative, but its absolute value is much larger
(−0.20) with a much larger t-ratio. This can be viewed as evidence of the ﬂeeting character
of aggressively priced buy limit orders; such orders are more likely to be executed but also
more likely to be cancelled before the seller arrives.
The absolute values of coeﬃcients corresponding to the last two covariates (STKV and
TURN) are much larger for the execution risk than for the cancellation risk. All coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcantly negative, suggesting the negative eﬀect of both relative and absolute levels of
market activity on the time-to-execution and time-to-cancellation of buy limit orders. This
indicates that the increase of trading activity causes more buy limit orders to be picked up
by aggressive sellers and also induces the buy limit order traders to cancel their previously
submitted limit orders more urgently.
The four rightmost columns of Table 3 report the parameter estimates of the generalized
gamma accelerated failure time model for sell orders, along with their t-statistics. The eﬀects
of most covariates on the time-to-execution and time-to-cancellation of sell limit orders are
in agreement with the eﬀects of the corresponding covariates for buy limit orders.
B.2. Weibull and Cox Proportional Hazard Models with Independent Risks
The conclusions based on the estimates of the Weibull and Cox proportional hazard models
(Tables 4 and 5) are generally in agreement with the interpretation of the estimated para-
meters of the generalized gamma AFT model. The diﬀerence between the two models is
19that the proportional hazard models focus on the hazard rates of competing risks while the
generalized gamma AFT model focuses on the risk-speciﬁc durations, so the signs of the
coeﬃcients of all variables in the proportional hazard models are opposite to those in the
generalized gamma AFT model for buy orders, as expected. Discrepancies between the signs
on the covariate eﬀects for sell limit orders are predominantly conﬁned to the coeﬃcients
that appear to be small and economically insigniﬁcant.25
W ee m p h a s i z eo n c ea g a i nt h a tt h ec o e ﬃcients on the variable MQLP characterizing
the price aggressiveness of the limit order are large, highly economically and statistically
signiﬁcant, and have opposite signs for buy (−0.97)a n ds e l l( +1.14) limit order executions.
The eﬀect of the price aggressiveness on the cancellation hazard rates are still signiﬁcant
but much smaller in magnitude for buy (−0.06) and sell (+0.03) limit orders. This clearly
indicates that the hazard rates of buy and sell order executions and cancellations tend to
increase with the limit price aggressiveness, but the execution risk is much more sensitive
to changes in the limit order price. This also indicates that the instantaneous odds that
an order will be terminated by cancellation rather than execution tend to increase for less
aggressively priced orders.
Once again, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of the past buy/sell indicator variable BSID are only
economically and statistically signiﬁcant for buy order execution risks. The same qualitative
conclusion generally applies to the eﬀects of variables MKD1 and MKD2 on execution and
cancellation hazards; the hazard rates of executions appear to be much more sensitive to
the variation of those variables than the hazard rates of cancellations. Parlour (1998) shows
that if the market depth is greater on the buy side (variable MKD1), then the probability of
execution of a subsidiary limit buy order is smaller. However, if the market depth is thicker
on the sell side (variable MKD2), then the probability of execution of a subsidiary limit
order is greater. Our results provide some support for this prediction. The reasoning is as
follows. Suppose a trader enters the market and observes that there are so many limit sell
orders on the book that she becomes reluctant to submit a sell limit order since it has a
low chance of being executed. Instead, this trader may jump the queue by bettering the
current book or submitting a marketable sell order to cross the best opposing price. Thus,
the execution probability of buy orders on the book will increase.
The only covariate whose variation has a substantial eﬀect on the cancellation risk and
negligible eﬀect on the execution risk is SZSD, which measures the liquidity demanded by
limit orders scaled by the limit order price aggressiveness. This can be viewed as an evidence
25Due to the large sample size, small and economically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients are often statistically
signiﬁcant. Therefore, one should be cautious about making inferences based on their t-statistics. Also see
our discussion of the estimates for the competing risks model with gamma frailty below.
20that, other things being the same, large limit orders tend to be cancelled much sooner than
small limit orders. The size eﬀect magniﬁes when a large limit order is submitted further
away from the best quote on the opposite side of the market. In other words, small order
traders are willing to wait longer than large order traders before cancelling their orders,
especially if the limit order has been submitted close to the best quote on the opposite side
of the market.
According to our model, the limit order size does not seem to aﬀect the probability of
its execution. This is likely to be a consequence of our treatment of partial executions (see
our discussion at the beginning of Section III for details). We treat all executions — partial
and complete — similarly, interpreting the time-to-ﬁrst-ﬁll of a limit order as its execution
time. As a result, aggressive traders demanding only a small amount of liquidity, would still
be ﬁlling the limit orders, no matter whether they are large or small, just taking as much
liquidity as necessary and leaving the rest of the limit order unﬁlled.
Again, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients on the last two covariates (STKV and TURN)
generally tends to be larger for execution risk than for cancellation risk. Both coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting the positive eﬀect of relative and absolute levels of past
trading activity on the hazard rates of executions and cancellations.
Finally, the estimates of γ1 and γ2 are both smaller than unity, indicating that the two
competing risks hazard both decline as the limit order stays on the book longer. Since γ1
tends to be much larger than γ2, the baseline hazard rate tends to decline much faster for
cancellation risk. We interpret this as evidence of the ﬂeeting character of limit orders, which
tend to be cancelled much more frequently early in their lifetimes. Surprisingly, this eﬀect is
substantial even after we excluded from the analysis the limit orders executed or cancelled
within the ﬁrst two seconds of their lifetime.
B.3. Weibull Proportional Hazard Model with Gamma Frailty
The estimation results for the Weibull competing risks model with gamma frailty are pre-
sented in Table 6. Since this model focuses on estimating the hazard rates, we expect the
coeﬃcients in Table 6 to have similar signs to the coeﬃcients in Tables 4 and 5 discussed in
subsection B.2. A thorough comparison of those tables reveals that most coeﬃcients indeed
tend to have similar signs, which means that the Weibull model with gamma frailty and
the model with conditionally independent competing risks might have qualitatively similar
implications. However, there are several important diﬀerences.
Before discussing those diﬀerences and similarities, note that the coeﬃcients on the co-
variates in Table 6 should be interpreted as the sensitivities of hazard rates for cancellation
and execution risks conditional on the observed covariates and an unobserved state variable
21(frailty), which aﬀects both competing risks multiplicatively. This should be always kept
in mind when the signs and magnitude of the coeﬃcients in Table 6 are compared to those
from Tables 4 and 5; the estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 represent the sensitivities of
execution and cancellation hazard rates conditional on the observed covariates only.
The coeﬃcient on the variable of MQLP in the hazard rates for execution of buy limit
orders is signiﬁcantly negative (−1.19) and larger than the corresponding coeﬃcient (−0.97)
in the model with independent Weibull competing risks. Similarly, the magnitude of the
coeﬃcient of this variable tends to increase in the gamma frailty model for cancellation rate
of buy limit orders (−0.13) relative to the same coeﬃcient in the model with independent
competing risks (−0.06). Indeed, conditioning on the unobserved frailty parameter appears
to reduce the noise, which in turn tends to boost the hazard rate sensitivities.
T h en e g a t i v es i g n so ft h ec o e ﬃcients corresponding to the covariate BSID in the con-
ditional hazard rates of execution and cancellation indicate that if the prior transaction
has been on the buy side, a shorter time-to-execution (−0.16) and a slightly shorter time-
to-cancellation (−0.04) of a buy limit order are expected. Our results are consistent with
previous studies. For example, Lo et al. (2002) reports that if the prior transaction was
seller-initiated, a longer time-to-execution is expected for buy orders.
The coeﬃcients on the variable of MKD1 are signiﬁcantly negative in the hazard func-
tions of both execution and cancellation of buy limit orders. This indicates that a longer
time-to-execution and a longer time-to-cancellation are expected if the proxy for the number
of shares having higher priority to execution on the buy side is larger. In contrast, the coeﬃ-
cients on the variable of MKD1 tend to be less signiﬁcantly negative in the hazard functions
of sell order execution and tend to be closer to zero in the hazard functions of sell order can-
cellation. This provides some evidence that a large number of shares having higher priority
to execution on the sell side does not tend to increase substantially the time-to-cancellation
of a lower priority sell limit order, suggesting that sell limit order traders tend to be more
patient.
On the other hand, the positive signs of the estimated coeﬃcients of MKD2 in the models
for buy and sell order execution (+0.24 and +0.29, respectively), indicate that the greater is
the depth on the opposite side of the market, the shorter is the expected time-to-execution,
and the eﬀect is stronger for sell limit order execution. At the same time, the estimated
coeﬃcient of MKD2 for the cancellation risk is essentially close to zero for buy limit orders,
and negative (−0.10) for sell limit orders, indicating that the large depth on the opposite
side of the market tends to discourage sell limit order cancellations but does not seem to
aﬀect buy limit order cancellations.
In contrast to the competing risks model with conditionally independent Weibull com-
22peting risks, the coeﬃcients of the variable SZSD become signiﬁcantly positive for both
executions and cancellations of limit orders. This indicates that both execution and cancel-
lation risks are increasing with the size of the limit order and the distance between its limit
price and the best price on the opposite side. Still, the cancellation rates grow faster with
the size of SZSD than execution rates for both sell and buy limit orders suggesting that
even though executions tend to be spurred by the larger limit order size, the cancellation
rates of such limit orders also tend to increase, and they increase at somewhat higher rate,
even after the common frailty factor is taken into consideration.
We also observe, once again, that the coeﬃcients of the last two covariates (STKV and
TURN) are much larger for the execution risk than for the cancellation risk. All coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting the positive eﬀect of both relative and absolute levels of
market activity on the execution and cancellation hazard rates for buy and sell limit orders.
Finally, the estimates of γ1 and γ2 are both signiﬁcantly larger than unity, which indicates
that the hazard rates of the two competing risks (conditional on the covariates and an
unobserved frailty parameter) are increasing, while the rate of increase appears to be much
faster for the conditional baseline hazard rate of execution relative to the conditional baseline
hazard rate of cancellation. The unobserved heterogeneity appears to be important, as it
aﬀects the size and, occasionally, the sign of the covariate eﬀects. The unobserved covariates
that aﬀect proportionally the execution and cancellation hazard rates but are not included
as explanatory variables appear to be a probable cause for dependence between the risks of
limit order execution and cancellation.
B.4. Comparison Across Stocks and Time Periods
Table 7 summarizes the signs and signiﬁcance of the estimated covariate eﬀects based on
the Weibull proportional hazard model with conditionally independent competing risks for
buy and sell limit orders across the alternative stocks and time periods.26 We estimated
our model separately for buy and sell orders in each of the four moderately liquid stocks
month-by-month for each month (July—December 2005). Because of the huge number of
observations, our estimation for the liquid ticker INTC was performed using the data from a
randomly selected business day of each month. Since all our estimates have similar qualitative
interpretations, we focus our discussion in this subsection on the stability of the signs of
covariate eﬀects across time periods and the robustness of our results across diﬀerent stocks.
Clearly, most of the covariates are robust in both direction and magnitude across the
sample stocks. For example, eﬀects of MQLP is negative (positive) and signiﬁcant for
26The numerical values of estimated coeﬃcients for the alternative stocks and time periods can be requested
from the authors.
23all stocks and both execution and cancellation risk, for buy (sell) orders. Likewise, the
coeﬃcients of BSID, MKD1, MKD2, TURN,a n dSTKV are all signiﬁcant and have
expected and consistent direction for both buy and sell order executions, although the sign
of these coeﬃcients are more variable and less stable for cancellations.
The only covariate that changes the sign for both executions and cancellations is SZSD.
We think that the reason this covariate changes sign across stocks and months reﬂects the
asymmetric variation in the depth of the limit order book on the buy and sell sides across
m o n t h s ,l i k e l yd r i v e nb ys t o c k - s p e c i ﬁc information events such as earnings announcements
and other news arrivals. A similar explanation can be proposed for the relatively unsta-
ble signs of most covariates for the cancellation risk. The detailed exploration of factors
underlying this instability is left for future research.
V. Goodness of Fit and Model Selection
We compare the goodness-of-ﬁt of alternative models using the modiﬁed cumulative probabil-
ity plots in combination with the numerical diagnostics (percentile statistics). Our approach
parallels the method of Lo et al. (2002); however, we explicitly account for the presence of
multiple risks and right-censoring.27
A. Cumulative Probability Plots for Competing Risks
The idea of probability plots can be described as follows. Denote by
Q1(t|t0,z)=P r {T1 <t ,T 2 ≥ T1|t>t 0,z},
Q2(t|t0,z)=P r {T2 <t ,T 1 ≥ T2|t>t 0,z},
the true conditional incidence rates of the two competing risks deﬁned for durations t ∈
(t0;tc(z)],w h e r etc(z) is the deterministic right-censoring time, which may be a function of
market conditions Z = z prevailing at the time of the limit order submission. For any vector
of risk-speciﬁcd u r a t i o n s(T1,T 2) and auxiliary uniform [0;1] random variable S (independent





Q1(T1|t0,z) if T1 < min(T2,t c(z)),
Q2(T2|t0,z) if T2 < min(T1,t c(z)),
Qc(t0,z) · S if tc(z) ≤ min(T1,T 2),
(22)
27Without loss of generality, we can assume that all observations with ti ≤ t0 have been eliminated from
the empirical sample of durations {ti}n
i=1.
24which must be uniformly distributed on [0;1],w h e r e
Qc(t0,z)=1− Q1(tc(z)|t0,z) − Q2(tc(z)|t0,z)
is the conditional probability of right-censoring of the limit order given the information
that the order has survived for t0 seconds since its submission at the market conditions
characterized by the covariate vector z. The vector of exogenous covariates Z
d ∼ ΦZ(·) and
the auxiliary uniform [0;1] random variable S can be integrated out of the expression (22)
to obtain the random variable
Q(T1,T 2|t0)=
ZZ
Q(T1,T 2,s|t0,z) · 1[0;1](s)dsdΦZ(z)
which must be uniformly distributed on [0;1].
Now assume that we have a sample of data {(ti,j i,δi,zi)}
n
i=1,w h e r eti >t 0, ji =1or
2, δi =0or 1,a n dzi are the observed covariates. Augmenting this sample by an auxiliary
sequence of uniformly distributed random numbers {si}
n
i=1, and transforming it into the
sequence of




Q1(ti|t0,zi) if ji =1and δi =1 ,
Q2(ti|t0,zi) if ji =2and δi =1 ,
Qc(t0,zi) · si if δi =0 ,
(23)
should yield an approximately uniformly distributed random sample on [0;1].I ft h es a m p l e
of exogenous covariates {zi}
n
i=1 is “representative,” so that its empirical distribution function
b Φz1,...,zn(z) is close to the theoretical cdf ΦZ(z), then the sample of random numbers {πi}
n
i=1
obtained by the formula (23) should be approximately uniformly distributed on [0;1].A sa
result, a valid test of the hypothesis that the sequence of {πi}
n
i=1 is drawn from a uniform
[0;1] distribution would serve as a test that Q1(t|t0,z) and Q2(t|t0,z) indeed provide the true
functional forms of the conditional incidence rates for the competing risks in the interval of
durations t ∈ (t0;tc(z)].
In practice, the parametric functional forms of the conditional incidence rates Q1(t|t0,z)
and Q2(t|t0,z) are unknown and must be estimated. We use the estimates b Θ of our
model’s unknown parameters to obtain proxies for the incidence rates Q1(t|t0,zi; b Θ) and
Q2(t|t0,zi; b Θ). Then we plug those proxies into formula (23) to obtain the sequence of πi(b Θ)
that could be subsequently used to construct a diagnostic plot of our model’s goodness-of-ﬁt.
If the model is speciﬁed correctly, then the estimated conditional incidence rates Q1(t|t0,z; b Θ)
and Q2(t|t0,z; b Θ) should be close to the true incidence rates π1(t|t0,z) and π2(t|t0,z),a n d
25the estimated conditional right-censoring probability Qc(t0,z; b Θ)=1− Q1(tc(z)|t0,z; b Θ) −
Q2(tc(z)|t0,z; b Θ) should be close to the true conditional right-censoring probability Qc(t0,z).





Q1(ti|t0,zi; b Θ) if ji =1and δi =1 ,
Q2(ti|t0,zi; b Θ) if ji =2and δi =1 ,
Qc(t0,zi; b Θ) · si if δi =0 ,
(24)
should be similar to those of the sequence {πi}
n
i=1 obtained by formula (23) from the exact
expressions of the conditional rates Q1(t|t0,z), Q2(t|t0,z),a n dQc(t0,z).I f t h e m o d e l i s
correctly speciﬁed, the sample {b πi}
n
i=1 would be approximately uniformly distributed on




i=1, obtained from {b πi}
n
i=1 by
lexicographic ordering (ﬁrst by δi ∈ {1,0},t h e nb yji ∈ {1,2},a n dﬁnally by ti >t 0), would
b ec l o s et oas t r a i g h tl i n ew i t hau n i ts l o p e ,a n dt h es e q u e n c eo ft h ed y n a m i cg a p s( “ s c o r e s ” )
©
b π(i) − i
n+1
ªn
i=1 for all values of i would not deviate too far from the origin.28 Unusually large
positive (negative) slopes on the plot of “scores”
©









the range of incidence rates (and, by implication, the range of durations and the type of
events) where the model tends to overpredict (underpredict) the empirical frequencies of
those events.
The same idea can be used to construct diagnostic plots for evaluation of alternative com-
peting risks model performance out-of-sample. The only diﬀerence is that the estimates b Θ of
the unknown parameters used to obtain the parametric functional forms of the conditional
rates Q1(t|t0,z; b Θ), Q2(t|t0,z; b Θ),a n dQc(t0,z; b Θ) are obtained using the training sample,
while the sample {(ti,j i,δi,zi)}
n
i=1 used for construction of the random sequence {b πi}
n
i=1
must come out-of-sample, for example, using the limit order data for a diﬀerent stock or a
diﬀerent time period.
Details of this general algorithm customized for the construction of diagnostic plots for
the three alternative competing risks models of this paper appear in Appendix II.
B. Model Selection
Figure 1 displays the diagnostic cumulative probability plot based on the predicted risk-
speciﬁc incidence rates for the Weibull proportional hazard model with independent com-
peting risks of execution and cancellation for buy limit orders. Superimposed on this plot
28In the covariate-free case, the distribution of the random process
©
b π([nr]) − r
ª
r∈[0;1] must be identi-
cal to that of a Brownian bridge. In the more general case with covariates, the distribution of process ©
b π([nr]) − r
ª
r∈[0;1] would depend on the properties of covariates, even though it would still cluster around
the origin if the model is correctly speciﬁed.
26are similar plots for the gamma frailty model with Weibull baseline hazard functions and
for the generalized gamma AFT model. The sample of limit order durations is left-censored
at t0 =2seconds and right-censored at tc =6 0 0seconds or the duration corresponding to
4 p.m. EST, whichever occurs earlier. Among the three models, the Weibull proportional
hazard with conditionally independent competing risks model demonstrates a much better
overall goodness-of-ﬁt performance relative to the other two models (generalized gamma
AFT and Weibull PH model with gamma frailty). Similar plots for alternative competing
risks models of sell limit order execution and cancellation support the same conclusion.29
Figures 2a and 2b provide an even more striking illustration as they show the goodness-
of-ﬁtf o rt h er i s k - s p e c i ﬁci n c i d e n c er a t e sa sf u n c t i o n so fd u r a tion since the limit order arrival
(only the duration range between 2 and 120 seconds is shown on the plots). These plots give
a more nuanced picture in support of the conclusion that the Weibull proportional hazard
speciﬁcation with conditionally independent competing risks predicts the empirical incidence
rates of execution and cancellation events much better than the AFT model with the risk-
speciﬁc durations modeled by the generalized gamma distribution. Since the generalized
gamma AFT model severely overpredicts the risk of execution and underpredicts the risk
of cancellation, the inference based on this model should be approached with caution and
this model’s predictions of limit order execution and cancellation events would generally
be unreliable. Both Weibull proportional hazard models (with and without gamma frailty)
generally perform much better in ﬁtting the incidence rates of execution events, although the
Weibull proportional hazard model with conditionally independent competing risks tends to
perform slightly better.
In terms of ﬁtting the incidence rates of cancellation events, the Weibull proportional
hazard model with independent competing risks signiﬁcantly outperforms not only the gen-
eralized gamma AFT model, but also the Weibull hazard model with gamma frailty. For
example, the Weibull gamma frailty model predicts that a randomly selected buy limit order
will be cancelled between 2 and 7 seconds after its submission with probability of approxi-
mately 25% (provided that it is not cancelled or executed prior to the two-second duration
mark). In contrast, the empirical probability of buy order cancellation within the same time
interval is slightly higher than 45% (As a result, the cumulative scrore diﬀerential at 7 sec-
onds is −0.2 for this model in Figure 2b). The generalized gamma AFT model fares much
worse, predicting only the 10% cancellation probability in the duration interval between 2
and 7 seconds after the limit order submission. The gap between predicted and empirical
probabilities of cancellations for the generalized gamma AFT model tends to be even larger
for longer durations.
29Those plots are available from the authors upon request.
27In summary, the generalized gamma accelerated failure time model of competing risks
fails miserably, severely overpredicting the execution risk and underpredicting the cancel-
lation risk. The Weibull proportional hazard competing risks model with gamma frailty
performs better for the risk of limit order execution, but still fails to adequately capture the
cancellation risk. The Weibull proportional hazard model with conditionally independent
competing risks demonstrates the best overall performance among the three models con-
s i d e r e di nt h i sp a p e r ,a d e q u a t e l yc a p t u r i n gt h e execution and cancellation risks in-sample
and providing satisfactory predictions out-of-sample.30 Therefore, we believe that the char-
acterization of competing risks provided by the Weibull proportional hazard model with
conditionally independent competing risks appears to be more plausible, and the estimates
of covariate eﬀects based on this model are more reliable.
VI. Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper we build and estimate three econometric models of limit order execution and
cancellation using competing risk analysis and the INET datafeed for ﬁve Nasdaq stocks. Of
particular importance is our formulation of dependent competing risks models that provides
adequate characterization for the times to limit order executions and cancellations.W ea l s o
oﬀer a way to graphically demonstrate the goodness-of-ﬁt of the alternative models. Time-
to-execution is found to be more sensitive to the limit price than time-to-cancellation, but
time-to-cancellation appears to be more sensitive to the limit size than the time-to-execution
(measured as time-to-ﬁrst-ﬁll). Therefore, a safe way to reduce the time-to-execution with
minimal increase in the risk of later cancellation is to increase the price aggressiveness of
the submitted limit order. More importantly, we ﬁnd that if investors want to reduce the
expected time-to-execution for their limit orders without inducing any signiﬁcant increase
in the risk of subsequent cancellation should submit their orders when the market depth is
smaller on the side of their orders or when the market depth is greater on the opposite side
of their orders.
Our future research plans include (but are not limited to) the following. First, since the
order size (related to the covariate SZSD) appears to be an important factor inﬂuencing
the cancellation risk, and often is used to distinguish retail orders from institutional orders,
we plan to compare results by splitting orders according to order size. Similarly, since
cancellation strategies used by limit order traders are likely to depend on price aggressiveness
(determined by the covariate MQLP), it may be advantageous to compare results by splitting
orders according to their price aggressiveness. This may reveal some important diﬀerences
30The out-of-sample diagnostic plots are available from the authors upon request.
28in the trading strategies employed by market participants.
Second, introducing time-varying covariates in our models is an important direction for
future research. Traders submit their limit orders based on current market conditions and
their anticipation of future changes in market conditions, so it is reasonable to expect that
the limit order trading strategy is a dynamic process unfolding in real time. Introducing
time-varying covariates would allow us to capture the eﬀect of adjustments that many limit
order traders are likely to make in response to changes in market conditions over the lifetime
of the order.
Finally, the large fraction of cancelled orders suggests that it would be important to
consider what a trader does after cancelling an order. For example, if the trader wants to
buy a certain number of shares, then we can think of an expected price and time-to-execution
trade-oﬀ. The typical trader on INET will submit multiple orders to meet his objective and
we could use the competing risks model estimates to generate a forecast for the time until
completion for a given policy; where a policy may be deﬁned as a distance between the quote
and the order price. An interesting question might be to determine the price-time trade-oﬀ,
which is a potential measure of traders’ demand for liquidity.
29Appendix I: Technical Derivations
Derivation of (3)
Note that we observe only a sample of realizations of (T,J,δ). We know that if δ =0 ,
then T = t ≥ tc and if δ =1 , we observe either (T = T1 = t, J = j =1 )or (T = T2 = t,
J = j =2 ) . Furthermore, the left censoring assumption T1 >t 0, T2 >t 0 is always maintained
and for notational simplicity, we use Pr(·|t0) and Pr(·|T1 >t 0,T 2 >t 0) interchangeably.
Therefore, assuming that the censoring rule is exogenous, which is the case of limit orders,
the log-likelihood function for a single observation (T,J,δ) takes the form
lnL =( 1− δ)lnPr(δ =0 |T>t 0)+δlnPr(T = t,J = j|δ =1 ,T >t 0), (A1)
where
Pr(T = t,J = j|δ =1 ,T >t 0)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
Pr(T = T1 = t|δ =1 ,j=1 ,T = T1 >t 0)
×Pr(δ =1 ,j=1 |T = T1 >t 0) if j =1 ,
Pr(T = T2 = t|δ =1 ,j=2 ,T = T2 >t 0)
×Pr(δ =1 ,j=2 |T = T2 >t 0) if j =2 ,
(A2)
is the joint probability density for (T,J) conditional on δ =1 . As a result, in order to derive
the likelihood function, we just need to obtain expressions for Pr(δ =0 |T>t 0) and each of
the probabilities on the right-hand side of (A2). We derive each of them in turn.
First,
Pr(δ =0 |T>t 0)=P r ( T ≥ tc|T>t 0)
=P r ( T1 ≥ tc, T2 ≥ tc|T1 >t 0, T2 >t 0)=S(tc,t c|t0).( A 3 )
Second,
Pr(T = T1 = t|δ =1 ,j=1 ,T = T1 >t 0)Pr(δ =1 ,j=1 |T = T1 >t 0)
=
Pr(T = T1 = t|T = T1 >t 0)
Pr(δ =1 ,j=1 |T = T1 >t 0)
Pr(δ =1 ,j=1 |T = T1 >t 0)
=P r ( T = T1 = t|T = T1 >t 0)
=P r ( T2 >t|T1 = t,T = T1 >t 0)Pr(T1 = t|T = T1 >t 0). (A4)
Therefore, in order to derive Pr(T = T1 = t|δ =1 ,j =1 ,T = T1 >t 0)Pr(δ =1 ,j =1 |T =
T1 >t 0), we just need to obtain Pr(T2 >t|T1 = t,T = T1 >t 0)Pr(T1 = t|T = T1 >t 0),
30which can be obtained as follows
Pr(T2 >t|T1 = t,T = T1 >t 0)Pr(T1 = t|T = T1 >t 0)
=l i m
ε→0 Pr(T2 >t|t ≤ T1 ≤ t + ε,T1 >t 0, T2 >t 0)
×Pr(T1 = t|T1 >t 0, T2 >t 0)
= lim
ε→0
Pr(t + ε>T 1 >t ,T 2 >t |T1 >t 0, T2 >t 0)
Pr(t + ε>T 1 >t |T1 >t 0, T2 >t 0)









ε Pr(t + ε>T 1 >t |T1 >t 0, T2 >t 0)




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
t1=t2=t
= f (t,1|t0), (A5)
that is




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
t1=t2=t
= f (t,1|t0) (A6)
and, similarly,




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
t1=t2=t
= f (t,2|t0). (A7)




((1 − δi)lnS (tci,t ci|t0)+δi lnf (ti,j i|t0)) (A8)
where





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
t1=t2=t
,j =1 ,2. (A10)
31Derivation of (5)
S (t1,t 2|t0)=P r ( tc ≥ T1 >t 1,t c ≥ T2 >t 2|t0)
=P r ( T1 ≤ tc,T 2 ≤ tc|t0) − Pr(T1 ≤ t1,T 2 ≤ tc|t0)
−F(T1 ≤ tc,T 2 ≤ t2|t0)+F (T1 ≤ t1,T 2 ≤ t2|t0)
= F (tc,t c|t0) − F (t1,t c|t0) − F(tc,t 2|t0)+F (t1,t 2|t0).( A 1 1 )
Derivation of (8)
Since T1 and T2 are independent, given that each of these durations exceeds t0,w eh a v e
S (t1,t 2|t0)=S (t1,t 2|T1 >t 0,T 2 >t 0)=S1 (t1|T1 >t 0)S2(t2|T2 >t 0). On the other hand,
hj (t|t0)= l i m
4t→0




P (t ≤ Tj <t+ 4t|Tj >t 0)








where j =1 ,2, fj(t|t0) is the marginal density for Tj conditional on Tj >t 0 and the last









, j =1 ,2. (A13)
Therefore,












Since hj (t|t0,Z; θj), j =1 ,2, are independent conditional on Z = z,t h e nSj (t|t0,Z; θj),
j =1 ,2, are also independent conditional on Z = z. Therefore, we have








































































, j =1 ,2,w h i c h
is a result in the derivation of (8).
Derivation of (21)
Since hj (t|Z,V ; θj), j =1 ,2, are independent conditional on Z = z and V = v,t h e n
the functions Sj (t|Z,V ; θj), j =1 ,2, are also independent conditional on Z = z and V = v.
Therefore, we have








































































, j =1 ,2,w h i c hi si n
turn a result of the derivation of (8), while the second equality follows from the speciﬁcation
(19).
Since V is not observable, S (t1,t 2|z,v;θ1,θ2) cannot be used for estimation. We have to
integrate v out of the above expression to obtain the joint survival function conditional on
Z = z but unconditional on V . With the assumed gamma density for the random variable
























































































































33Then we can write





































































































































































Appendix II: Construction of Diagnostic Plots
1. Step 1 of the algorithm depends on the functional form of the evaluated model. There-
fore, it will be described separately for each of the three alternative competing risks
model evaluated in this paper.
(a) For the generalized gamma AFT independent competing risks model with the




shape of the generalized gamma distributions and the covariate eﬀects (j =1 ,2),
use the expressions for the risk-speciﬁc conditional duration (11) and conditional















ib βj),j =1 ,2, (A20)
where {zi}
n
i=1 is the sequence of observed covariates, {(u1i,u 2i)}
n
i=1 is the sequence
of i.i.d. uniformly distributed pseudo-random vectors, and Γ−1(κ,y) is the inverse
gamma function of y (i.e., the solution a of equation Γ(κ,a)=y).
34(b) For the model of conditionally independent Weibull proportional hazard compet-




characterize the shape of the Weibull baseline hazard functions and the covari-
ate eﬀects (j =1 ,2), use the expressions for the risk-speciﬁc conditional survival













,j =1 ,2, (A21)
where {zi}
n
i=1 is the sequence of observed covariates, and {(u1i,u 2i)}
n
i=1 is the
sequence of i.i.d. uniformly distributed pseudo-random vectors.
(c) For the gamma frailty model of Weibull proportional hazard competing risks with




2), ﬁrst obtain the pseudo-
random simulated values of frailty coeﬃcients {e vi}n
i=1 by drawing them as i.i.d.
gamma(b α,1) pseudo-random numbers, then use the expressions for the risk-speciﬁc
conditional hazard functions (17) and the simulated frailty coeﬃcients {e vi}n
i=1 to












,j =1 ,2, (A22)
where {zi}
n
i=1 is the sequence of observed covariates, and {(u1i,u 2i)}
n
i=1 is the
sequence of i.i.d. uniformly distributed pseudo-random vectors.
2. For each value of index i =1 ,...,nsuch that e ti ≡ min(e t1i,e t2i) ≤ t0, discard this value
of e ti a n dr e t u r nt os t e p1 .
3. Using e tji, j =1 ,2, obtained at steps 1 and 2, determine the sample {(e ti,e ji,e δi,z0
i)}n
i=1,
where e ti =m i n ( e t1i,e t2i) >t 0, e ji =a r g m i n
j=1,2
e tji, e δi =0if e ti >t c(zi) and e δi =1if
e ti ≤ tc(zi),a n dzi is the observed covariates that pre-determine the right-censoring
duration tc(zi). Generate the auxiliary sequence {si}
n
i=1 of i.i.d. uniformly distributed
pseudo-random numbers.




i=1 of the predicted risk-speciﬁc incidence rates





Q1(e ti|t0; b Θ) if e ji =1and e δi =1 ,
Q2(e ti|t0,zi; b Θ) if e ji =2and e δi =1 ,
Qc(t0,zi; b Θ) · si if e δi =0 ,
(A23)
where the incidence rates Qj(t|t0;Θ) for t>t 0 and j =1 ,2 are approximated by





1{e tk ≤ t and e jk = j}, (A24)
and the proxy for the right-censoring rate Qc(t0;Θ) can be obtained as
e Qc(t0; b Θ)=1− e Q1(∞|t0; b Θ) − e Q2(∞|t0; b Θ). (A25)
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40Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the sample
This table presents basic numerical characteristics of the four stocks — American Capital Strategies
Ltd. (ticker: ACAS), Associated BanCorp (ticker: ASBC), Imclone Systems Inc. (ticker: IMCL),
and Career Education Corp (ticker: CECO) — randomly selected for this study, as well as a highly
liquid stock, Intel Corp (ticker: INTC). All medians and averages are reported for the period of
July—December 2005, unless indicated otherwise.
ACAS ASBC IMCL CECO INTC
Average daily # of buy orders 2268 2694 3838 4505 44694
Median buy order size (round lots) 1 1 1 1 3
Average daily # of buy orders executed 208 169 325 406 5547
Average daily # of buy orders cancelled 2061 2525 3512 4100 39146
Average daily # of sell orders 2359 2697 4145 4852 45323
Median sell order size (round lots) 1 1 1 1 3
Average daily # of sell orders executed 236 194 329 420 5715
Average daily # of sell orders cancelled 2123 2506 3816 4432 39518
Average transaction price ($ per share) 37.48 32.02 32.64 36.15 25.41
Median INET transaction size (lots) 1 1 1 1 3
Average daily # of INET transactions 652 363 654 826 11262
Average daily INET trade volume (lots) 685 485 1097 1144 58644
Average NBBO quoted spread ($) 0.022 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.01
Median NBBO depth at bid (lots) 5 4 8 5 260
Median NBBO depth at ask (lots) 4 4 8 4 264
Average monthly realized volatility 8.8% 13.9% 21.2% 21.2% 23.9%
Average weekly realized volatility 13.3% 11.8% 30.9% 32.6% 21.1%
Average daily realized volatility 15.9% 14.4% 44.3% 35.3% 21.3%
Average hourly (10 am—4 pm) volatility 18.9% 16.2% 40.3% 31.2% 22.5%
Price-to-earnings ratio in July, 2005 9.36 12.73 10.25 12.80 16.53
Market capitalization in July, 2005 ($ bn) 4.67 4.15 2.73 2.78 104.71
41Table 2: Descriptive statistics of risk-speciﬁcd u r a t i o n sa n dc o v a r i a t e sf o rt h eA C A Ss t o c k
This table provides the descriptive statistics for durations (times-to-termination) and covariates
used in the competing risks analysis based on buy and sell limit orders for the American Capital
Strategies Ltd. (ACAS) stock. The sample includes all INET limit orders submitted between 10
a.m. and 4 p.m. EST in July—December 2005. Limit orders submitted more than $0.25 away from
the bid-ask mid-quote are excluded. Limit orders executed or cancelled within two seconds after
their submission are excluded. The upper triangle of the correlation matrix is for Sell orders, and
the lower triangle is for Buy orders. All variable deﬁnitions are in Section III, B. of the text.
Variable Mean St.Dev. Skew Kurt. 1%-tile 50%-tile 99%-tile
Duration 45.57 190.71 40.2 2646 2.08 13.66 425.12
MQLP 3.05 3.09 3.31 18.1 0.5 2.5 19.5
BSID −0.02 0.97 0.03 1.07 −1 0 1
Buy MKD1 6.17 1.05 −1.14 9.39 4.61 6.23 8.57
orders MKD2 5.73 0.96 0.40 2.99 4.22 5.76 8.33
SZSD 5.58 0.87 0.39 4.66 4.11 5.51 7.88
STKV 0.53 0.13 0.12 3.05 0.23 0.53 0.85
TURN 11.48 0.55 0.86 5.24 10.42 11.45 13.07
Duration 44.66 194.25 39.2 2396 2.08 13.64 393.80
MQLP −2.95 3.00 −3.36 18.8 −19 −2 −0.5
BSID 0.08 0.96 −0.16 1.10 −1 1 1
Sell MKD1 6.08 1.15 −1.20 9.66 0 6.22 8.75
orders MKD2 5.80 0.93 0.21 2.76 4.26 5.86 8.20
SZSD 5.54 0.86 0.51 4.39 4.40 5.46 7.82
STKV 0.53 0.13 0.08 3.03 0.23 0.53 0.85
TURN 11.46 0.55 0.84 5.05 10.41 11.43 13.04
Correlation matrix for Buy and Sell orders
Sell orders
MQLP BSID MKD1 MKD2 SZSD STKV TURN
MQLP 0.044 −0.024 0.112 −0.271 −0.062 −0.076
BSID 0.018 −0.043 0.036 −0.043 −0.007 −0.037
Buy MKD1 0.005 0.057 −0.013 0.270 −0.027 −0.017
orders MKD2 −0.094 −0.018 −0.021 −0.003 −0.049 −0.045
SZSD 0.300 0.031 0.230 −0.018 0.017 0.037
STKV 0.058 −0.016 −0.019 −0.041 0.019 0.026
TURN 0.075 −0.034 −0.018 −0.032 0.017 0.027
42Table 3: Competing risks estimates for the generalized gamma accelerated failure time model
This table provides the fully parametric maximum likelihood estimates of the generalized gamma
accelerated failure time (AFT) model with two independent competing risks for American Capital
Strategies Ltd. (ACAS) buy and sell limit orders in July 2005 and December 2005. The estimates
in the upper panel correspond to the execution risk, while those in the lower panel correspond to
the cancellation risk. Parameters κ1, p1 are, respectively, the scale and shape parameters of the
generalized gamma distribution for the duration time to buy (sell) limit order execution; parameters
κ2, p2 are, similarly, the scale and shape parameters of the generalized gamma distribution for the
duration time to buy (sell) limit order cancellation. The reported log-likelihood numbers are the
log-likelihood value per observation.
Buy Orders Sell Orders
July 2005 December 2005 July 2005 December 2005
Parameter Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat.
MQLP 0.994 39.1 1.071 41.3 −1.141 −48.3 −1.181 −49.1
BSID 0.118 5.51 0.130 6.63 −0.023 −1.27 −0.083 −5.10
MKD1 0.315 18.2 0.283 18.3 0.238 18.6 0.277 23.9
MKD2 −0.214 −10.3 −0.263 −13.6 −0.291 −15.3 −0.322 −19.5
SZSD −0.046 −1.64 −0.032 −1.27 −0.031 −1.31 0.097 4.28
STKV −1.407 −8.74 −0.481 −3.42 −1.005 −7.64 −0.805 −6.79
TURN −0.689 −14.7 −0.658 −14.9 −0.601 −15.6 −0.584 −16.2
Const ×10−2 0.126 21.9 0.121 22.4 0.120 25.2 0.108 23.6
p1 0.187 6.94 0.151 6.89 0.220 9.85 0.160 8.96
κ1 11.252 19.06 15.976 27.8 9.272 21.3 17.482 32.3
MQLP 0.046 16.1 0.038 13.1 0.014 5.27 −0.060 −21.0
BSID 0.018 3.10 0.040 5.41 −0.006 −1.31 −0.011 −1.48
MKD1 0.036 5.81 0.088 12.3 −0.021 −4.55 0.035 5.38
MKD2 0.012 2.13 −0.002 −0.23 0.041 7.90 0.071 9.79
SZSD −0.196 −28.1 −0.190 −22.2 −0.167 −28.8 −0.287 −33.8
STKV −0.263 −5.92 −0.702 −11.9 −0.272 −7.45 −0.586 −10.4
TURN −0.257 −19.5 −0.304 −17.2 −0.147 −14.1 −0.312 −18.6
Const ×10−2 0.058 34.2 0.070 31.56 0.047 34.3 0.074 35.4
p2 −0.962 −39.1 −0.463 −30.5 −1.118 −47.6 −0.453 −30.8
κ2 0.830 15.9 2.618 59.3 0.677 10.7 2.697 64.3
lnL −4.5629 −4.9062 −4.5438 −4.8733
#o b s . 42683 35759 56311 40336
# exec. 2924 4124 3946 5836
#c a n c . 39507 31391 52141 34176
# right-cens. 252 244 224 324
43Table 4: Competing risks estimates for the Weibull proportional hazard model
This table gives the fully parametric maximum likelihood estimates for weibull model with two
independent competing risks for the American Capital Strategies Ltd. (ACAS) buy and sell limit
orders in July 2005 and December 2005. The estimates in the ﬁrst panel are associated with
execution risk and the estimates in the second panel are associated with cancellation risk. The
Weibull parameter estimates b γ1 and b γ2 are both smaller than unity, which can be interpreted
as an evidence of decreasing baseline hazards for both execution and cancellation risks, after the
eﬀect of observed covariates have been factored out. The reported log-likelihood numbers are the
log-likelihood value per observation.
Buy Orders Sell Orders
July 2005 December 2005 July 2005 December 2005
Parameter Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat.
MQLP −0.967 −35.5 −0.978 −41.9 1.137 43.0 1.149 44.9
BSID −0.123 −6.03 −0.107 −6.36 0.031 1.64 0.076 4.93
MKD1 −0.221 −14.0 −0.172 −12.5 −0.143 −10.7 −0.169 −14.8
MKD2 0.202 11.0 0.218 13.6 0.266 13.8 0.298 19.1
SZSD 0.026 1.01 0.016 0.76 −0.015 −0.64 −0.127 −6.34
STKV 1.083 7.15 0.301 2.63 0.833 6.61 0.628 5.71
TURN 0.574 13.0 0.541 14.4 0.567 15.1 0.507 15.1
Const ×10−2 −0.104 −19.3 −0.096 −20.9 −0.108 −22.8 −0.090 −20.7
γ1 0.728 48.8 0.662 53.8 0.759 55.8 0.688 61.4
MQLP −0.061 −30.2 −0.029 −14.8 0.034 15.1 0.049 24.9
BSID −0.013 −2.43 −0.019 −3.26 0.002 0.34 −0.003 −0.47
MKD1 −0.024 −4.65 −0.040 −6.99 0.031 7.28 0.001 0.18
MKD2 −0.009 −1.68 0.005 0.73 −0.034 −6.78 −0.055 −9.08
SZSD 0.246 38.0 0.170 24.2 0.187 33.6 0.262 36.7
STKV 0.319 7.97 0.516 11.5 0.299 8.52 0.511 11.6
TURN 0.289 25.3 0.280 20.0 0.145 14.8 0.292 21.6
Const ×10−2 −0.052 −34.9 −0.055 −30.8 −0.035 −27.5 −0.060 −34.5
γ2 0.386 93.1 0.469 103.6 0.388 110.9 0.470 106.0
lnL −4.4616 −4.8366 −4.4572 −4.7992
#o b s . 42683 35759 56311 40336
# exec. 2924 4124 3946 5836
#c a n c . 39507 31391 52141 34176
# right-cens. 252 244 224 324
44Table 5: Competing risks estimates for the Cox proportional hazard model
This table reports the semiparametric maximum likelihood estimates for the Cox proportional
hazard (CPH) model of independent competing risks for the American Capital Strategies Ltd.
(ACAS) buy and sell limit orders in July 2005 and December 2005. The estimates in the ﬁrst panel
pertain to the hazard rate of execution risk, and the estimates in the second panel pertain to the
hazard rate of cancellation risk.
Buy Orders Sell Orders
July 2005 December 2005 July 2005 December 2005
Parameter Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat.
MQLP −0.967 −41.3 −0.976 −43.8 1.137 51.7 1.146 50.3
BSID −0.123 −6.38 −0.108 −6.60 0.031 1.83 0.077 5.37
MKD1 −0.221 −18.2 −0.172 −17.2 −0.143 −15.6 −0.170 −21.3
MKD2 0.201 11.3 0.217 13.8 0.267 16.2 0.299 21.0
SZSD 0.031 1.19 0.014 0.70 −0.016 −0.71 −0.130 −6.60
STKV 1.083 7.58 0.303 2.71 0.830 6.98 0.620 6.11
TURN 0.576 13.6 0.541 14.8 0.568 15.9 0.508 16.1
MQLP −0.063 −30.4 −0.029 −14.5 0.036 19.0 0.049 23.7
BSID −0.012 −2.36 −0.019 −3.28 0.001 0.21 −0.003 −0.46
MKD1 −0.026 −4.88 −0.040 −7.29 0.031 7.41 0.001 0.22
MKD2 −0.008 −1.48 0.005 0.74 −0.033 −6.63 −0.054 −9.07
SZSD 0.249 38.8 0.169 24.1 0.188 34.4 0.260 38.5
STKV 0.314 7.98 0.519 12.0 0.301 8.71 0.516 12.2
TURN 0.287 25.2 0.283 20.8 0.144 14.7 0.295 22.4
#o b s . 42683 35759 56311 40336
# exec. 2924 4124 3946 5836
#c a n c . 39507 31391 52141 34176
# right-cens. 252 244 224 324
45Table 6: Competing risks estimates for the Weibull model with gamma frailty
This table reports the parametric maximum likelihood estimates for the Weibull model with two
dependent competing risks for the American Capital Strategies Ltd. (ACAS) buy and sell limit
orders in July 2005 and December 2005. The dependence between competing risks is captured by
the latent variable (frailty), which is assumed to have the gamma distribution with mean α and
variance α. The estimates in the ﬁrst panel are associated with the execution risk and the estimates
in the second panel are associated with the cancellation risk. The Weibull parameter estimates b γ1
and b γ2 are both larger than unity, which can be interpreted as an evidence of increasing baseline
hazards for both execution and cancellation risks, after conditioning on the values of observed
covariates and the unobserved gamma factor.
Buy Orders Sell Orders
July 2005 December 2005 July 2005 December 2005
Parameter Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat.
MQLP −1.189 −36.5 −1.163 −42.2 1.296 42.1 1.412 45.0
BSID −0.155 −6.59 −0.168 −8.56 0.048 2.19 0.103 5.73
MKD1 −0.404 −18.2 −0.339 −18.0 −0.261 −13.9 −0.339 −20.4
MKD2 0.235 10.8 0.269 14.5 0.290 12.9 0.332 18.5
SZSD 0.305 10.2 0.128 5.17 0.290 9.87 0.019 0.76
STKV 1.793 10.4 0.997 7.07 1.465 9.07 1.275 9.63
TURN 1.110 21.5 0.828 18.5 0.889 19.2 0.795 19.6
Const ×10−2 −0.189 −30.1 −0.149 −27.0 −0.175 −29.5 −0.145 −27.9
γ1 1.745 47.3 1.374 69.0 2.065 37.2 1.471 77.4
MQLP −0.126 −23.1 −0.073 −18.4 −0.020 −2.09 0.106 28.3
BSID −0.040 −3.42 −0.058 −5.45 0.022 1.87 0.021 2.07
MKD1 −0.100 −7.96 −0.130 −11.4 0.029 2.48 −0.062 −6.21
MKD2 −0.030 −2.62 0.023 2.17 −0.102 −8.24 −0.072 −7.07
SZSD 0.443 31.3 0.266 21.7 0.443 28.0 0.401 32.6
STKV 0.780 8.95 1.078 13.3 0.813 9.28 0.954 12.2
TURN 0.670 27.1 0.500 20.4 0.433 17.4 0.497 21.1
Const ×10−2 −0.123 −40.6 −0.104 −34.1 −0.103 −31.4 −0.109 −37.5
γ2 1.358 44.5 1.138 84.7 1.643 31.4 1.160 92.5
α 0.360 22.1 0.555 32.0 0.256 18.7 0.540 35.3
lnL −5.2407 −5.5767 −5.2322 −5.5319
#o b s . 42683 35759 56311 40336
# exec. 2924 4124 3946 5836
#c a n c . 39507 31391 52141 34176
# right-cens. 252 244 224 324
46Table 7: Summary of covariate eﬀe c t sf o ra l t e r n a t i v es t o c k sa n dt i m ep e r i o d s
These tables provide the summary of signs for the estimated covariate coeﬃcients in the Weibull
proportional hazard model with conditionally independent competing risks for each of the six
months in July—December 2005. The top panel of each table gives the signs for the covariate
sensitivities of execution risk, while the bottom panel of each table gives the signs for the covariate
sensitivities of cancellation risk. We assign +(−) sign if the t -statistic of the estimated parameter
is larger than 3.29 (smaller than −3.29), which corresponds to the nominal p-value 0.0005 for the
one-sided t-test of statistical signiﬁcance. = stands for a t -statistic between −3.29 and 3.29.
Each sign corresponds to one month.
Buy Orders (July—December 2005)
Parameter ACAS ASBC IMCL CECO INTC
070809101112 070809101112 070809101112 070809101112 070809101112
MQLP −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− −
BSID −−−−− − −−−= −− − = −−− − −−−−− − −− == − =
MKD1 −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− −
MKD2 +++++ + +++++ + +=+++ + +++++ + +++ +=+
SZSD = − ==== === −− = + === −+ +++= =+ −−−−−=
STKV +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + + +=+=+
TURN +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + + +=+++
MQLP −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− −
BSID == −− == − ===== +=− =+ + ====== =+= =+=
MKD1 −−−−− − === − =+ += =−+= +− = − = − =+ − = −−
MKD2 = −−− −= === − == − + −−− − + − += =− − + − + −−
SZSD +++++ + = −−−−− =+ += =+ +++ +=+ −−−−++
STKV +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + + +=+++
TURN +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + =+++++ + +=+++
Sell Orders (July—December 2005)
Parameter ACAS ASBC IMCL CECO INTC
070809101112 070809101112 070809101112 070809101112 070809101112
MQLP +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + +++++ +
BSID =+ += =+ +++++ + +++=+ + + +=+++ =+ +=+=
MKD1 −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− − −−−−− −
MKD2 + +=+++ +++++ + +=+++ + +++++ + +++++ +
SZSD = − = − = − == −− == + ===== +++ +=+ −−−−+=
STKV +++=+ + +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + +++++ +
TURN +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + +++++ + + +=+++
MQLP +++++ + ++− ++ + +++++ + +++++ + +++++ +
BSID ====== ====== == ++ = + == −− = − −−− −==
MKD1 + −−=== =+=+++ ++ === + = −+=−− − + − = − =
MKD2 −−−−− − +=−−− − − == −−− +− = −−− =+ − = − =
SZSD +++++ + = −−−−− − + −−++ +++++ + + −−=+ +
STKV +++++ + +++ +=+ +++++ + +++++ + +++++ +
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